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from the "one-way street" discovery currently practiced by the
Board, the remaining possibility of intimidation based upon
discovered information should not deter the adoption of at least a
modified form of discovery. Indeed, contrary to the Second Circuit's
conclusion in Interboro, the Board's current policy in this respect is
not a "logical one." Furthermore, contrary to that court's denial of
knowledge of federal agencies which provide for discovery, a number
of agencies now permit such a procedure.46 Since there is substantial
agreement that the Board has the authority to institute a discovery
rule and neither Congress nor the courts appears disposed to impose
discovery on the Board, it can only be hoped that the Board will
follow the lead of the agencies permitting such a procedure. If and
when a discovery rule is drafted, the drafters should not be confronted
with a choice between administrative efficiency and fundamenal
fairness. Instead, they must achieve the attainable integration of the
former with the latter 47 while insuring that the rights of all parties are
properly protected. 8
VII. DECISIONS AND SANCTIONS
ICC Continuing Jurisdiction
The Interstate Commerce Commission has been given broad
statutory authority to rehear previously decided cases' and "reverse,
change, or modify" its earlier orders.2 Moreover, the Commission has
asserted that through its inherent power as an administrative agency it
may on its own motion reconsider any matter on a theory of
continuing jurisdiction. 3 However, once the Commission has issued a
certificate of public convenience and necessity, certain statutory
46. See notes 14-16, supra and accompanying text. For a discussion of the Administrative
Conference recommendation on discovery, see Tomlinson, Discovery in Agency Adjudication,
1971 DuKE L.J. 89.
47. Symposium, The Role of Discovery in Federal Trade Commission Proceedings, 21 AD.
L. REV. 439, 442 (1969).
48. See NLRB v. Southern Materials Co., 345 F.2d 240, 244 (4th Cir. 1965).
1. Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 17(6) (1964) (parties may petition for rehearing at
any time).
2. Id. § 17(7).
3. See Eazor Express, Inc.-Purchase-Fleet Highway Freight Lines, Inc., 101 M.C.C. 719,
720 (1967).
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standards4 and judicial decisions' limit this reconsideration power. In
Chicago & North Western Railway v. United States,6 which illustrates
an unwise use of the reconsideration power, a three judge federal
district court 7 upheld an ICC award 8 of a certificate of public con-
venience and necessity to a motor carrier, reversing a previous denial
that had already been challenged by the carrier in court,' and
reaffirming the ICC's unlimited authority to reconsider.
This controversy began in 1964 when Walter Poole applied for
authority to transport farm implements by motor carrier and the
hearing examiner recommended that the application be granted.
Under a procedural scheme devised for routine cases,' 0 the appeal by
competing rail and motor carriers was heard by a review board
composed of three ICC employees, which reversed the hearing
examiner's decision authorizing issuance of the certificate." Poole's
petition to reconsider the board decision on his certificate was heard
by an appellate division 2 composed of five of the eleven Com-
missioners, but the appeal was rejected. 3 Commission procedure
includes a mechanism for review of appellate division findings by the
full Commission but only after a finding on the entire Commission's
4. Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 312 (1964) (revocation after notice and hearing
possible only on finding of willful violation of act, regulations, or terms of certificate).
5. See Watson Bros. Transp. Co. v. United States, 132 F. Supp. 905 (D. Neb. 1955), affd per
curiam, 350 U.S. 927 (1956).
6. 311 F. Supp. 860 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
7. See Project, Federal Administrative Law Developments-1 969, 1970 DuKE L. J. 67, 177-
78 n.2, for a full explanation of the statutory background of the procedure for review of ICC
orders under the Urgent Deficiencies Act procedure, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1253, 1336, 2284, 2321-25
(1964).
8. Walter Poole Extension-Tractors to Ala., 105 M.C.C. 511 (1967).
9. Poole v. United States, No. 4423-67-P (S.D. Ala., filed January 24, 1967) (dismissed at
Poole's request July 23, 1968).
10. See generally 3 W. KNORST, INTERSTATE COMMERCE LAW AND PRAcTICE 1327-28 (1954).
Items assigned to employee boards are generally ones in which the so-called modified procedure
is used. General Policy Statement Concerning Motor Carrier Licensing Procedures, 31 Fed.
Reg. 6600 (1966). The modified procedure employs verified complaints and omits the formal
oral hearing. 49 C.F.R. §§ I 100.45-.54 (1970); 49 ICC ANN. REP. 97 (1935). See also General
Policy Statement Concerning Motor Carrier Licensing Procedures, 31 Fed. Reg. 6600 (1966).
11. Walter Poole Extension-Tractors to Ala., 103 M.C.C. 906 (1966).
12. The appellate division assumes the full power of the ICC for the purpose of disposing of
the application. 49 U.S.C. § 17(6) (1964); 49 C.F.R. § 1100.101(g) (1970); 49 ICC ANN. REP.
97 (1935); see General Policy Statement Concerning Motor Carrier Licensing Procedures, 31
Fed. Reg. 6600 (1966).
13. 49 U.S.C. § 17(4) (1964); 49 C.R.F. § 1100.101 (a)(2) (1970). The loser in the appellate
division may petition the appellate division for reconsideration, or at his option, attempt to
secure full ICC review. See id. § 1100.101(g).
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own motion that the matter under review is one of "general
transportation importance."' 4 Poole's attempt to invoke this
discretion was denied. He then instituted court action to review the
ICC's refusal to grant his certificate. 5
While Poole's district court action was pending, the ICC on its
own motion vacated the order of the review board which had denied
Poole the certificate and reopened the case without mention of any
issue of general transportation importance. On the prior record the
Commission adopted the findings of the hearing examiner and
granted Poole's original application. 6 Two railroads which had
appeared in opposition to the application petitioned the ICC for
reconsideration, but the Commission denied the petitions and issued
the certificate. Although Poole subsequently abandoned his federal
court action, four railroads and two motor carriers brought suit in
another district court to set aside the ICC order granting the
certificate of public convenience and necessity to Poole. In Chicago &
North Western, the court, in upholding the issuance of the certificate,
acknowledged the power of the ICC to subject appellate division
rehearing decisions to full Commission review without any explicit
finding of general transportation importance.
The Chicago & North Western court settled several important
procedural points before it reached the merits.' 7 Since, as with most
federal agency rulings, review of ICC orders on the merits is extremely
narrow, the court had little difficulty in finding the order supported by
substantial evidence on the record as a whole.' 8 It upheld the ICC's
interpretation of the scope of its own authority to review previous
decisions, relying on section 17(7) of the Interstate Commerce Act 9
14. 49 U.S.C. § 17(6) (1964) (Commission may limit its consideration of issues to those of
general transportation importance); 49 C.F.R. § l100.101(a)(2), (4) (1970) (implementing
statutory authority). But see text accompanying notes 23-30 infra.
15. Poole v. United States, No. 4423-67-P (S.D. Ala., filed January 24, 1967).
16. Walter Poole Extension-Tractors to Ala., 105 M.C.C. 511 (1967). The vote was 6 to 3.
17. 311 F. Supp. at864.
18. See Midwest Emery Freight System, Inc. v. United States, 293 F. Supp. 403, 405 (N.D.
Ill. 1968); cf. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
19. If after rehearing, reargument, or reconsideration of a decision, order, or
requirement of a division, an individual Commissioner, or board it shall appear that the
original decision, order or requirement is in any respect unjust or unwarranted, the
Commission or appellate division may reverse, change or modify the same accordingly.
Any decision, order or requirement made after rehearing, reargument, or
reconsideration, reversing, changing or modifying the original determination shall be
subject to the same provisions with respect to rehearing, reargument or reconsideration
as an original order. 49 U.S.C. § 17(7) (1964).
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and an earlier district court opinion? ° The court distinguished the
concept of administrative finality from the power of an agency to
reconsider its own decision, noting that the Interstate Commerce Act,
unlike the statutes establishing some of the other regulatory agencies,
does not specify when the Commission's power to change its decisions
terminates. 21 However, the majority admitted that the Commission's
power to reconsider a negative order or denial of a certificate did not
imply that the Commission had continuing jurisdiction if a certificate
had issued. Finally, the majority explicitly disregarded persuasive
dicta from an earlier case involving the crucial issue of whether the
full ICC may review orders of an appellate division in any case.2
In Transamerican Freight Lines, Inc. v. United States3 the court
had expressed the view that the statute grants the ICC two mutually
exclusive procedures for reviewing the decisions of its inferior bodies.
2
'
The decisions of boards, single Commissioners, or divisions are to be
referred for final review to either the full Commission or to an
appellate division.? Petitions for reconsideration may then be filed to
the same body, 25 be it the full Commission2 or an appellate division.21
When these procedures were proposed, the ICC noted that "[tihe
decisions of the appellate division in such cases [will be] final the same
as if [they] were by the entire Commission."'" The Transamerican
court specifically disapproved the procedure later used in Chicago &
North Western for full ICC reconsideration of an appellate division
decision?. Resort Bus Lines v. United States,31 relied on in Chicago &
20. Resort Bus Lines, Inc. v. United States, 264 F. Supp. 742 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). See text
accompanying note 31 infra.
21. Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 17(6) (1964); cf. National Labor Relations Act
§ 10(e), 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1964); Natural Gas Act § 19, 15 U.S.C. § 717(r) (1964) (filing
of record in court terminates agency power to reconsider).
22. 311 F. Supp. at 863.
23. 258 F. Supp. 910 (D. Del. 1966).
24. 258 F. Supp. at 916-18.
25. After a decision, order, or requirement shall have been made by the Commission, a
division, an individual Commissioner, or a board. . . any party. . . may. . . make
application for . . . reconsideration..... If the decision, order, or requirement was
made by a division, an individual Commissioner, or a board, such application shall be
considered and acted upon by the Commission or referred to an appropriate appellate
division for consideration and action. 49 U.S.C. § 17(6) (1964).
26. Id.
27. 49C.F.R..§ 1100.101(a)(3) (1970).
28. Id. §1100.101(g).
29. 49 ICC ANN. RaP. 197.
30. 258 F. Supp. at 918.
31. 264 F. Supp. 742 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). 49 C.F.R. § l100.101(a)(4) (1970) allows ICC
review of appellate division orders, but only after a purely discretionary prior ICC finding of a
question of general transportation importance.
[Vol. 1971:149
ADMINISTRA TIVE LA W-1970
North Western, had held that an appellate division might reconsider
its own orders, leaving open the question of whether the full Com-
mission was empowered to reconsider appellate division orders. In
Chicago & North Western the court disregarded Transamerican's
rationale as "sua sponte and . . . totally unnecessary to the holding
of the case"3 2 relying primarily on the ICC's own disregard of the
Transamerican dicta.3 3 The court added that the parties had
demonstrated no detrimental reliance or prejudice although the
authorities cited14 did not clarify what effect such prejudice would
have on the instant case-a grant of a license after an earlier denial.3
The dissent adopted the Transmerican dicta that the full ICC does
not have power to reconsider the orders of an appellate division.36 It
dismissed the pronouncements of the ICC on the matter as "not
controlling, for it is the role of the judiciary and not of self-serving
administrative bodies to construe the law. ' 37 The dissent also noted
the obvious distinction between Resort Bus Lines and Chicago &
North Western: Resort Bus Lines holds only that an appellate
division may reconsider its own orders, making no reference to the
power of the full Commission to review decisions of an appellate
division.38 It attacked the ICC's theory of continuing jurisdiction at
the foundation, noting that in the cases on which the majority relies
some aspect of the proceeding was still pending before the
Commission when the case was reopened. 3' Alluding to City of
Chicago v. United States,'0 where a decision to terminate an
investigation was held final and subject to court review, the dissent
contended that a definite cut-off point for Commission action is
desirable.41 "[It] would be more consistent if we found that a negative
32. 311 F. Supp. at 863.
33. See Resort Bus Lines, Inc. v. United States, 264 F. Supp. 742, 745 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1967);
Eazor Express, Inc.-Purchase-Fleet Highway Freight Lines, Inc., 101 M.C.C. 719 (1967);
Walter Poole Extension-Tractors to Ala., 105 M.C.C. 511 (1967).
34. The court cited: Upjohn Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 381 F.2d 4 (6th Cir. 1967); Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. United States, 231 F. Supp. 422 (N.D. I11. 1964); Watson Bros.
Transp. Co. v. United States, 132 F. Supp. 905 (D. Neb. 1955).
35. 311 F. Supp. at 864 (investment of $200,000 in new equipment usable for class of service
at issue insufficient to show prejudice).
36. 311 F. Supp. at 868.
37. Id.
38. 264 F. Supp. at 745 n.5.
39. 311 F. Supp. at 870.
40. 396 U.S. 162 (1969);see Project, FederalAdministrative Law Developments-1969, 1970
DuKE L.J. 67, 177.
41. 311 F. Supp. at 871.
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order . .. rejecting an application . . .constituted administrative
finality and foreclosed further Commission consideration of the
matter. ' 42 Basically, the dissent contended that the majority
sanctions administrative reconsideration whenever a court challenge
to an order seems in the offing. It pleaded for a "firm decision...
whether positive or negative, [which] would both permit redress in the
courts and preclude further administrative reconsideration, whether
initiated by the parties or by the Commission."4 3 The majority
sanction of a separation of administrative finality and judicial
reviewability is intended to allow the ICC to correct its own errors,"
thereby serving judicial economy by possibly avoiding the necessity
for judicial review. However, the dissent argued persuasively that the
aggrieved party will most likely appeal anyway and the courts will
probably be asked to decide both the propriety of reconsideration as
well as the merits whenever an agency reopens a decision which the
parties thought to be final. The dissent noted finally that
restricting administrative "self-correction" will not result in any uncorrectable
injustice. If the Commission's error is serious, that is, not based on any
substantial evidence, then the aggrieved party may gain relief in court. If the
matter before the Commission is closely contested and different results may be
reasonably said to be based on substantial evidence, allowing the Commission
to change its mind achieves little in regard to administrative justice or better
interstate commerce.4
While agency power to police mere clerical errors" is certainly
desirable, indecision on the merits of an issue can result in a costly
waste of time by both courts and agencies. Sudden switches by an
agency from one result to another may cause substantial and
unnecessary prejudice to the parties.47 The dissent, quoting Professor
Davis, points out that some of the factors to be weighed are
the advantages of repose, the desire for stability, the importance of ad-
ministrative freedom to reformulate policy, the extent of party reliance upon
the first decision, the degree of care or haste in making the earlier decision,
[and] the general equities of each problemA
In Chicago & North Western it was perhaps unfortunate that the
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 863.
45. Id. at 872.
46. See Watson Bros. Transp. Co. v. United States, 132 F. Supp. 905 (D. Neb. 1955).
47. Cf. CAB v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 367 U.S. 316 (1961).
48. 2 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 18.09 (1958).
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majority felt constrained to uphold the ICC's freedom of action. Here
the Commission seemed bent on frustrating its own procedure for the
disposition of minor matters.4 ' "[C]onstant re-examination and
endless vacillation may become ludicrous, self-defeating. and even
oppressive."-' Surely, the question of whether a small trucker should
be allowed to transport tractors from factory to dealer could be
decided without the full ICC's wisdom. No one would contest the
undesirability of limiting consideration of issues of general
transportation importance to an appellate division. However, the ICC
should be prepared to live with the decisions of its appellate divisions
when it initially elects the procedure designed for review of less
important matters, leaving to the courts the task of correcting any
errors committed by an appellate division. Where a case has
originally reached the highest stages of agency review, is decided by
the agency, the losing party appeals, and the matter is pending in the
courts, stability of regulatory policy is hardly served by an agency
reversal long after the parties thought the decision final. Such
vacillation only invites further appeal by the party who suddenly finds
himself on the losing side and consequent loss in decision-making
efficiency.
Change of Agency Practice Without Adequate Statement of Reasons
In FTC v. Crowther5 the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit held that the FTC must fully explain its reasons for
departing from the approach adopted in a previous proceeding which
governed the disclosure of business information usually regarded as
confidential. The Commission had instituted Clayton Act s2 pro-
ceedings against the Lehigh Portland Cement Company challenging
its acquisition of several ready-mix concrete companies. Lehigh
requested that business information be subpoenaed from its
competitors and potential competitors. On a motion by the
competitors to quash the subpoena, the issue narrowed to the
competitors' request that the information be furnished only to an
independent accounting firm for compilation to prevent attribution to
any single company. The examiner felt compelled to follow the
49. 49 ICC ANN. REP. 97; General Policy Statement Concerning Motor Carrier Licensing
Procedures, 31 Fed. Reg. 6600 (1966).
50. Weiss, Administrative Reconsideration: Some Recent Developments in New York, 28
N.Y.U.L. REv. 1262 (1953).
51. 430 F.2d 510 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
52. Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
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